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INSTITUTION AND DECOMPOSITION OF NATURAL-DISASTER 
IMPACT ON GROWTH 
 
 
 
 
We investigated whether natural disasters enhance efficiency improvement, capital 
accumulation, and technological progress. Furthermore, we examined whether the 
influence of natural disasters depends on the legal origin. By using long-term panel 
data, this paper decomposes productivity growth measured by the growth of output per 
labor unit into three components: efficiency improvement, capital accumulation, and 
technological progress. After controlling for countries’ specific unobservable 
characteristics and year-specific effects, we found that the impacts of natural disasters 
vary according to specifications. Natural disasters enhance capital accumulation and 
technological progress in non-French-civil-law countries, but have no effect in these 
areas in French-civil-law countries.  (JEL : E25, O4, O15) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
External shocks have a tremendous effect on economic activity, and natural disasters 
are considered one such shock. Improvements in disaster-prevention technology would 
appear to reduce the influence of natural disasters in modern society. However, recent 
natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, have revealed that major disasters continue to have a profound effect 
on human society even in the most developed countries in the twenty-first century. 
Recently, there has been increasing interest in the economic consequences of natural 
disasters (Cavallo and Noy, 2009): for example, the impact of disasters on economic 
loss and death (e.g., Anbarci et al., 2005, Kahn, 2005, Escaleras et al., 2007; Toya and 
Skidmore, 2007; Cavallo et al., 2010; Yamamura, 2010), foreign direct investment (e.g., 
Escaleras and Register 2011), and economic growth (e.g., Skidmore and Toya, 2002; 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2008; Strobl 2011; Escaleras and Register 2012).  
There are various channels through which natural disasters influence economic 
growth (Skidmore and Toya 2002; Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2008). It has been argued 
that natural disasters lead to destruction of capital stock and so reduce output. Disaster 
risk reduces the expected return on physical capital, and so investment in physical 
capital falls (Skidmore and Toya, 2002). On the other hand, as asserted in the seminal 
work of Skidmore and Toya (2002), ―disasters also provide an opportunity to update the 
capital stock, thus encouraging the adoption of new technologies‖ (Skidmore and Toya 
2002, 665)
1
. That is, natural disasters appear to have both negative and positive effects 
                                                   
1
 More recent work of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2008) demonstrated that the level of a country‘s 
development influences the benefit from capital upgrading. 
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on economic growth
2
.  
Skidmore and Toya (2002) pointed out the importance of the insurance market 
when the impact of natural disasters on growth is considered. Thus, they noted that ―our 
study takes no account of the differential ability to insure against hazard‖ (Skidmore 
and Toya 2002, 682). The development of markets is believed to depend on institutional 
conditions. Institutions are considered to play an important role in reducing the impact 
of an economic crisis (Johnson et al., 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2003). As suggested by 
Cavallo and Cavallo (2010), the impact of an economic crisis, such as a banking crisis, 
on long-term economic growth depends on political institutions. In a similar way, the 
―net effect‖ of disasters on growth is thought to depend on such factors as the 
institutional background
3
. This is because long-term institutions are known to have a 
great effect on economic outcomes (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2002; 2001; Du 2010)
 4
. For 
example, a good deal of evidence suggests that legal origin is profoundly associated 
with incentives to economic agents and, therefore, economic performance (e.g., La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008). Countries with better-developed financial systems 
show superior growth in capital-intensive sectors (Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
Furthermore, legal origin is considered to exogenously determine the degree of financial 
development that promotes economic growth (Levine 1998). According to evidence 
provided by La Porta et al. (1998), French civil-law countries offer the weakest legal 
protection to investors. It seems plausible therefore to assume that the insurance market 
                                                   
2
 In a similar vein, there are contradictory views about the impact of economic crises on growth 
(Cavallo and Cavallo, 2011). Crises increase uncertainty and reduce investment, resulting in 
impeded economic growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995). Conversely, crises enhance institutional 
improvements, leading to a rise in economic performance (Drazen 2002; Bordo 2007). 
3
 However, an economic crisis appears to be an endogenous variable. Natural disasters are 
considered exogenous rather than endogenous shocks. 
4
 The size of the aggregate price shock needed to alter financial conditions depends on the 
institutional environment (Bordo et al., 2002). 
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is less developed in French civil-law countries. In response to destruction of physical 
capital by natural disasters considered as a kind of external shock, investment in 
physical capital plays an important role in recovery from disaster damage and 
subsequent growth. After a natural disaster has occurred, investment in physical capital 
is, however, likely to be low in a country that offers poor legal protection to investors 
and thus has a less-developed insurance market. Consequently, natural disasters would 
be expected to hamper capital accumulation in French civil-law countries, impeding 
economic growth. However, the extent to which the impact of natural disasters on 
capital accumulation depends on institutions has hitherto received insufficient attention
5
. 
The aim of this paper is to remedy that. 
In addition to capital accumulation, technological progress is a key factor in 
economic development. As asserted by Schumpeter (1912), creative destruction is the 
engine of technological progress, leading to economic growth. Natural disasters can be 
considered a catalyst of creative destruction (Skidmore and Toya 2002). It is important 
to decompose economic growth into various factors and then to examine the impact that 
natural disasters exert on them. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) allows the 
construction of a production frontier and the decomposition of labor-productivity 
growth into three components: efficiency improvement, capital accumulation, and 
technological progress (Banker et al. 1984; Cooper et al., 2000). Previous reports 
(Yamamura 2011, Yamamura and Shin 2007a, 2007b, 2008, Zheng et al., 1998; 2003) 
have used DEA to decompose labor-productivity growth so as to investigate economic 
growth more closely. Through regression analysis, these studies have examined how 
                                                   
5
 Skidmore and Toya (2002) found that natural disasters increased human capital accumulation 
rather than physical accumulation. However, they did not explore the relationship between natural 
disasters and human capital accumulation in terms of different institutional conditions. 
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various key independent variables have an effect on these three components. Adopting 
this approach, the present paper attempts to examine how natural disasters affect not 
only economic growth but also capital accumulation, efficiency improvement, and 
technological progress. Furthermore, the degree of influence of natural disasters on 
these factors depends on institutional settings, such as a country‘s legal origin, and that 
is also addressed in the present study. 
Using panel data from 57 countries over a 25-year period from 1965 to 1989, the 
present study controls for year-specific and unobservable country-specific effects
6
. The 
main findings here provide evidence as follows: the effects of natural disasters on 
labor-productivity growth vary according to specifications and are thus inconclusive. 
However, natural disasters enhance capital accumulation and technological progress for 
non-French-civil-law countries, though disasters have no such effect in French-civil-law 
countries. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains briefly the strategy of the 
method used in the present paper and describes data sources. Subsequently, regression 
functions are presented. Section III discusses the results of the estimations. The final 
section offers concluding observations. 
 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 
                                                   
6
 Skidmore and Toya (2002) did not control for the unobserved time-invariant features of countries 
when they examined the impact of natural disasters on growth; this was probably because they used 
a cross-sectional dataset. In addition to cross-country data, Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2008) used panel 
data to examine the impact of natural disasters on growth. They did not control for the unobserved 
time-invariant features of countries, although regional dummies were included. Hence, institutional 
factors were not controlled for in these studies.  
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Data 
 
Table I presents the independent-variable definitions, means, and the standard 
deviations of the analyzed data. The data relating to capital stock, per capita GDP, and 
population were collected from the Penn World Table (pwt 6.3), spanning the years 
1965 to 1990 for 57 countries
7
. Apart from dependent variables, the variables were as 
follows. The key variable is the number of natural disasters, represented as NATDIS, 
which is predicted to affect economic growth. NATDIS was gathered from the 
Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), which is constructed by the Center for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Government size is a critical 
determinant of economic growth (Yamamura 2011). To capture government size, the 
rate of general government final consumption expenditure over GDP, which is 
represented as GOVSIZ, was included as an independent variable and was gathered 
from the World Bank (2010). The degree of international trade is believed to influence 
productivity. Economic openness, represented as OPEN, was captured by the rate of 
trade over GDP, which was collected from the Penn World Table (pwt 6.3). The proxy 
of human capital was schooling years, represented as SCHOOL. Schooling years for 
1960, 1970, and 1980 were collected from Easterly and Levine (1997). Schooling years 
were unavailable for some years and so were insufficient for constructing panel data.  
Therefore, additional data were generated by interpolation, based on the assumption of 
constant changes in rates to make up for this deficiency
8
. The Gini coefficient of income, 
represented as GINI, was collected from the Standardized Income Distribution Database 
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 The data are available from the Center of International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed May 1, 2007).  
8
 It must be noted that these data may suffer from measurement errors when interpolation is 
conducted. Caution should thus be exercised when interpreting the estimation results. 
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(SIDD) constructed by Salvatore (2008)
9
.  
 
Method 
Kumar and Russell (2002) used DEA to construct a cross-country dataset by 
decomposing labor-productivity growth into three components. They conducted a 
simple, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, where the independent variable 
was the output per worker (labor-productivity) in 1965; the dependent variables were 
the percentage change between 1965 and 1990 for output per worker (labor-productivity 
growth), technological change, efficiency index, and capital accumulation index.  
Following the approach of Kumar and Russell (2002)
10
, the DEA method can 
decompose labor-productivity growth into efficiency improvement, capital 
accumulation, and technological progress, based on the Penn World Table (Färe et al., 
1994, 1996)
11
. This approach has an advantage over the growth accounting approach in 
that we can further decompose total factor productivity growth, thereby obtaining more 
detailed information. I take these variables as dependent variables. This method allows 
an assessment of how and to what extent natural disasters have an effect on productivity 
growth through capital accumulation, efficiency improvement, and technological 
progress. (1) Capital accumulation can be regarded as a contribution of investment in 
physical capital to labor-productivity growth. (2) Efficiency improvement can be 
                                                   
9
 SIDD is based on a comprehensive collection of income-distribution data from the World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID), which is compiled by the United Nations University‘s World Institute 
for Development Economics Research. SIDD adjusts the raw WIID data for differences in scope of 
coverage, income definition, and reference unit to a nationally representative gross-income 
household per capita standard. There are various versions of SIDD, such as SIDD-1, SIDD-2, and 
SIDD-3. The present paper used SIDD-3, which is an interpolated and extrapolated version of 
SIDD-2. 
10
 Kumar and Russell (2002) admitted that their method includes the possibility of an implosion of 
the technological frontier. Henderson and Russell (2005) precluded an implosion of this frontier over 
time. In the present paper, it is also precluded.  
11
 This decomposed dataset is also used in Yamamura and Shin (2007a) and Yamamura (2011). 
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considered the contribution of technology (knowledge) spillovers to labor-productivity 
growth. (3) Technological progress can be considered the contribution of technology 
replacement, capturing Schumpeterian-type creative destruction to labor-productivity 
growth. 
Using the above method, it is possible to examine whether and to what degree 
natural disasters—in determining productivity growth—affect investment in physical 
capital, technology (knowledge) spillover, and technology replacement.   
 
Specification of the regression function 
 
I would now like to formulate a regression function, which takes growth of labor 
productivity, growth of the level of efficiency, growth of the level of per capita capital, 
and change in the level of technology as dependent variables, denoted as GYit. GYit, is 
LYit1–LYit0. To estimate their determinants, the following equation is postulated: 
 
LYit =  1 LYit0 + 2NATDISit0 + 3 GOVSIZit0 + 4 OPENit0 + 5SCHOOLit0 + 6 
GINIit0 + ti   +uit ,  
 
εt , iti u,  represent the following unobservable effects, t‘s year-specific effects, the 
i’‗s prefecture-specific effects, and the error term, respectively. t0 is the lagged year of 
the t‘s year. i  represents the time-invariant feature. The dataset used in this study has 
a panel structure. I incorporate a lagged-dependent variable, LYit0, to control for the 
initial level. I employed a fixed-effects model with year dummies as the two-way 
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fixed-effects model. The definition of each independent variable is presented in Table I. 
NATDIS represents the number of natural disasters, and it consists of various type of 
disasters. Previous works have divided these into climatic and geologic disasters and 
examined their effects on economic growth (Skidmore and Toya 2002; 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2008). In addition to NATDIS, their effects were also examined. 
The effects of climatic disasters are almost the same as those of NATDIS, while 
geologic disasters have no effect on dependent variables. This is consistent with the 
argument that ―climatic disasters are more reasonably proxy for physical capital-related 
catastrophic risk than geologic disasters since they tend to impact larger economic areas 
and occur periodically‖ (Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2008, p.221). The results of climatic 
and geologic disasters are not reported here although they are available upon request. 
The frequency of natural disasters varies according to geographic factors. For instance, 
the probability of natural disasters depends on the location of a country with respect to 
plate tectonic fault lines. Furthermore, countries with a greater land surface area have a 
greater tendency to experience natural disasters even if other geographic conditions are 
the same. That is, the land mass is positively associated with the probability that natural 
disasters may take place in a country, which leads to estimation bias. To control for this, 
the number of disaster events is normalized by the land area (Skidmore and Toya 2002; 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2008). The size of the land area is considered a time-invariant 
country-specific effect. Hence, the fixed-effects estimation control for this, and thus the 
unadjusted total number of natural disasters, is used in this paper.  
The level of disaster-prevention technology is believed to improve over time, 
leading to a reduction in damage produced by natural disasters. Furthermore, climate 
changes around the world influence the frequency of natural disasters. These effects can 
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be covered in εt, which is controlled by incorporating year dummies. 
Apart from the key variable NATDIS, the initial level of income (LY_1) seems to 
be related to damage caused by natural disasters (e.g., Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 
2007; Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008; Yamamura 2010). Government size, represented 
as GOVSIZ, appears to be associated with economic growth since governments 
influence the allocation of resources and therefore impede economic activity 
(Yamamura 2011). Economic openness (OPEN) appears to enhance the introduction of 
new technologies to help prevent disasters. Schooling years (SCHOOL) captured human 
capital effects, which are widely known to be one of the key determinants of economic 
growth. Income inequality, measured by Gini coefficients, is also considered to be 
associated with economic growth. 
 
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
The estimation results of the fixed-effects model with a year dummy, which can be 
considered a two-way fixed-effects model for labor-productivity growth, capital 
accumulation, efficiency improvement, and technological progress, are presented, 
respectively, in Tables II, III, IV, and V. In each table, the results of the whole sample, 
the sample of non-French-civil-law countries, and those of French-civil-law countries 
are displayed as (a), (b), and (c). Each table indicates the results of five specifications 
for checking whether the data are robust to alternative specifications. The sample size 
was reduced when independent variables were added because additional independent 
variables were not available for some countries. This paper focuses on the effect of 
natural disasters on each dependent variable. 
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Labor-productivity growth 
 
Table II shows the results concerning the determinants of labor-productivity 
growth. NATDIS yields a positive sign in all estimations in Table IIa, b, and c. However, 
it is statistically significant only in columns 1 and 2 of Table IIa and c, and in columns 2 
and 5 of Table IIb. Thus, by using the whole sample, it is not conclusive whether 
NATDIS has a positive effect on labor-productivity growth. Furthermore, the impact of 
natural disasters shows no difference between non-French- and French-civil-law 
countries. At least, it can be argued that natural disasters do not reduce 
labor-productivity growth, which is in line with the findings reported using 
cross-country data (Skidmore and Toya, 2002). 
 
Capital accumulation 
 
From Table IIIa, it is evident that NATDIS produced a positive sign in all columns, 
while being statistically significant in columns 1 and 2. Therefore, the positive effects of 
natural disasters on capital accumulation are not robust to alternative specifications. The 
results presented in Table IIIb indicate that the coefficients of NATDIS take a significant 
positive sign in all estimations. This demonstrates that natural disasters enhanced capital 
accumulation in non-French-civil-law countries. Conversely, Table IIIc indicates that 
the coefficients of NATDIS take a positive sign in columns 1, 4, and 5 though they take 
a negative sign in columns 2 and 3. From this, it can be concluded that natural disasters 
have a positive impact on capital accumulation in non-French-civil-law countries but 
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not in French-civil-law countries.  
Skidmore and Toya (2002) argued that natural disasters reduce investment in 
physical capital because the expected rate of return to physical capital is reduced. 
Conversely, Skidmore and Toya (2002) also pointed out the possibility that ―the 
potential increase in human capital induced by natural disasters may increase the return 
to physical capital, leading to an increase in physical capital investment. Also, some 
resources are used for disaster management and physical capital replacement following 
a disaster so that physical capital investment would increase‖ (Skidmore and Toya 2002, 
677). Furthermore, ―some countries may have highly developed insurance markets and 
therefore may be able to reduce the risks associated with disasters‖ (Skidmore and Toya 
2002, 682). In French-civil-law countries, where legal protection for investors is weak, 
the insurance market is considered to be less developed (La Porta et al., 1998; 2008). 
The findings of the present paper indicate that the legal protection for investors 
increases the benefit following natural disasters on investments in physical capital. 
Consequently, the positive effects of natural disasters on investment outweigh the 
negative ones, leading to an increase in investment in physical capital in 
non-French-civil-law countries. 
 
Efficiency improvement 
 
I now turn to the results of Table IV. In Table IVa and c, the coefficient of NATDIS 
yields a positive sign in all columns. Conversely, it is evident in Table IVb that the 
coefficient of NATIDS produces a negative sign except in column 5. NATDIS, however, 
is not statistically significant in all estimations in Table IV a, b, and c. This means that 
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natural disasters do not influence efficiency improvement at all, regardless of legal 
origin. I interpret this as suggesting that natural disasters do not enhance technology 
spillover, which is unaffected by legal origin.    
 
Technological progress 
Table Va indicates that NATDIS produces a positive sign in all columns and is 
statistically significant, with the exception of column 5. Therefore, the positive effects 
of natural disasters on technological progress are, to a certain extent, robust to 
alternative specifications. The results of Table Vb are similar to those in Table III a. It is 
clear from Table Vb that the coefficient of NATDIS takes a positive sign in all 
estimations and is statistically significant, with the exception of column 5. Conversely, 
Table Vc indicates that the coefficients of NATDIS take a positive sign in all columns, 
though this is not statistically significant in all estimations. Hence, natural disasters do 
not influence technological progress in French-civil-law countries. This confirms that 
natural disasters stimulate technological progress, resulting in Schumpeterian creative 
destruction. This effect of natural disaster is observed for non-French-civil-law 
countries but not for-civil-law countries. Put another way, Schumpeterian creative 
destruction takes place in response to an exogenous shock, such as a natural disaster. 
This, however, relies on institutional conditions to capture the legal protection for 
investors. The above findings can be interpreted as follows: The rate of return from 
investment in research and development (R&D) is low when the legal protection for 
investors is weak. Consequently, investment in R&D in response to natural disasters 
decreased in French-civil-law countries, which of course had a negative effect on 
technological progress. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In response to an upsurge in interest in the outcomes of natural disasters from 
an economic point of view, an increasing number of studies have recently been devoted 
to investigating how such disasters affect economic growth. Little is known, however, 
regarding the channels through which natural disasters exert an effect on productivity 
growth. It is open to question whether the influences of natural disasters on capital 
accumulation, technology spillover, and technology progress are different. Accordingly, 
rather than putting an emphasis just on labor-productivity growth, this paper 
decomposes such growth into several components and closely examines them.  
It is increasingly acknowledged that long-term institutional factors, such as the 
legal origin, have an effect on economic outcomes. As shown by Cavallo and Cavallo 
(2010), the impact of an economic crisis, such as a banking crisis, on growth varies 
according to institutional conditions. A natural disaster exerts a different type of shock 
to that of an economic crisis in that a natural disaster has a direct destructive impact on 
physical capital. In addition, natural disasters are thought to be a kind of exogenous 
shock; thus, examining the effect of natural disasters can be undertaken in the form of a 
natural experiment, although the occurrence of natural disasters, to a certain extent, can 
be predicted. Thus far, no researcher, however, has explored the impact of natural 
disasters on growth and institutional conditions. Hence, this paper attempts to examine 
how and to what extent the effect of natural disasters differs between different legal 
origins. To this end, this paper employs the DEA method for examination, using panel 
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data from countries during the period 1960–89.  
This paper compares the effect of natural disasters between French- and 
non-French-civil-law countries after controlling for year-specific and country-specific 
characteristics. This allows geographic characteristics of different countries to be 
controlled for. Accordingly, the effects of a country‘s land area and location can be 
controlled for and thereby exert no influence on the estimation results. Hence, variations 
in the frequency of disasters between French- and non-French-civil-law countries do not 
affect the estimation results. The key findings derived from empirical estimates are as 
follows: based on the whole sample of countries, the effects of natural disaster on 
capital accumulation, efficiency improvement, and technological progress are 
ambiguous. Once the sample is divided into non-French- and French-civil-law countries, 
natural disasters are seen to enhance capital accumulation and technological progress in 
non-French-civil-law countries, whereas such disasters have no effect in these areas in 
French-civil-law countries. 
From the above findings, it can be plausibly pointed out that legal protection of 
investors is important in enhancing capital accumulation and thereby aiding recovery 
from the damage caused to physical capital stock after natural disasters. What is more, 
legal protection triggers Schumpeterian creative destruction through technological 
progress, whereas legal protection does not have an influence on knowledge spillovers 
captured by efficiency improvement. From this, I derived the argument that the role 
played by natural disasters on capital accumulation and Schumpeterian creative 
destruction depends on historical institutional conditions. Hence, it is important to 
consider the interaction between exogenous shock and institutions when examining 
economic growth. 
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It should be noted that legal origin possibly captures other factors, such as religious 
and cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, the effect of legal origin possibly reflects the 
level of economic development even if the level of output per worker is controlled for. 
If these points hold true, a different interpretation of the results of this paper may be 
made. For a closer examination of the legal origin effect, a micro-level dataset should be 
used to control for the level of a country‘s development and various institutional and 
individual characteristics. This is a major issue that remains to be addressed in future 
studies. 
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TABLE I 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES, SOURCES, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Notes: Sample is the same as that used for estimation results shown in column (5) in Tables II–V. 
a. Data obtained from http://www.emdat.be. (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
b. Data is available from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20700002~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469
382,00.html (access at June 2, 2011). 
c. Data is available from http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads (accessed on June 2, 2011). 
Data of French-civil-law countries is available from http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
Variables Definition Source Mean Standard  
deviation 
LY_1 Output per worker in log form Penn World Table. 5.6. 1.18 0.55 
NATDIS Total number of disasters Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)
a
 0.01*10
-2 
4.88*10
-2 
GOVSIZ General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Penn World Table . 5.6. 1.24*10
-2 
2.04*10
-2 
OPEN Trade (% of GDP) 
 
World Development Indicators 2010 0.76*10
-2 
1.53*10
-2 
SCHOOL Schooling years 
 
Easterly and Levine (1997) 0.39 0.08 
GINI Income Gini coefficients 
 
 
Standardized Income Distribution Database 
(SIDD)
c
 
0.38 0.37 
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TABLE II 
  Determinants of productivity growth (fixed-effects model) 
 
(a) Whole sample  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.05*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.04*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.06*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.04*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.03*** 
(-2.83) 
NATDIS 0.001** 
(2.56) 
0.001** 
(2.84) 
0.001 
(1.37) 
0.001 
(1.36) 
0.001 
(1.21) 
GOVSIZ -0.001 
(-1.37) 
-0.001 
(-1.28) 
-0.001* 
(-1.70) 
-0.0009 
(-0.97) 
 
 
OPEN 0.0007** 
(2.61) 
0.0006** 
(2.58) 
0.0006*** 
(3.30) 
  
SCHOOL -0.04 
(-1.49) 
-0.03 
(-1.24) 
   
GINI 0.0001 
(0.48) 
    
R-square(within)  0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 
Sample 
Groups 
1046 
44 
1121 
47 
1312 
55 
1312 
55 
1425 
57 
 
(b) Sample of non-French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.05* 
(-1.92) 
-0.03 
(-1.63) 
-0.04** 
(-2.23) 
-0.03** 
(-2.19) 
-0.02 
(-1.64) 
NATDIS 0.001 
(1.37) 
0.001* 
(1.84) 
0.001 
(1.68) 
0.001 
(1.65) 
0.001** 
(2.31) 
GOVSIZ -0.003** 
(-2.31) 
-0.003** 
(-2.75) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.003** 
(-2.67) 
 
 
OPEN 0.0006* 
(1.89) 
0.0004 
(1.56) 
0.0004 
(1.56) 
  
SCHOOL -0.07* 
(-1.85) 
-0.06* 
(-1.82) 
   
GINI 0.0007 
(0.56) 
    
R-square(within)  0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Sample 
Groups 
513 
21 
563 
23 
638 
26 
638 
26 
700 
28 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE II 
  Determinants of productivity growth (fixed-effects model) 
 
(c) Sample of French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.07*** 
(-4.83) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.11*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.07*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.67) 
NATDIS 0.002* 
(2.01) 
0.002* 
(1.99) 
0.0005 
(0.33) 
0.0007 
(0.43) 
0.0002 
(0.15) 
GOVSIZ 0.0004 
(0.28) 
0.001 
(0.93) 
0.0008 
(0.52) 
0.001 
(1.08) 
 
 
OPEN 0.001*** 
(3.30) 
0.001*** 
(3.85) 
0.0008*** 
(3.37) 
  
SCHOOL 0.01 
(0.74) 
0.04 
(1.23) 
   
GINI 0.0001 
(0.43) 
    
R-square(within)  0.30 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.17 
Sample 
Groups 
533 
23 
558 
24 
674 
29 
674 
29 
725 
29 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE III 
 Determinants of capital deepening (fixed-effects model) 
 
(a) Whole sample  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.001 
(-0.15) 
0.009 
(0.96) 
0.011 
(1.13) 
0.017* 
(1.98) 
0.015** 
(2.10) 
NATDIS 0.0006** 
(2.34) 
0.0005* 
(1.99) 
0.0004 
(1.27) 
0.0004 
(1.21) 
0.0004 
(1.35) 
GOVSIZ -0.001** 
(-2.47) 
-0.0009** 
(-2.08) 
-0.0009** 
(-2.11) 
-0.0006* 
(-1.70) 
 
OPEN 0.0003*** 
(2.74) 
0.0002** 
(2.14) 
0.0002** 
(2.14) 
  
SCHOOL 0.02 
(1.19) 
0.03 
(1.62) 
   
GINI 0.0004* 
(1.76) 
    
R-square(within)  0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 
Sample 
Groups 
1046 
44 
1121 
47 
1312 
55 
1312 
55 
1425 
57 
 
(b) Sample of non-French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.004 
(-0.34) 
0.0005 
(0.05) 
0.009 
(0.71) 
0.012 
(0.89) 
0.013 
(1.14) 
NATDIS 0.0007** 
(2.45) 
0.0009*** 
(3.04) 
0.0007** 
(2.09) 
0.0007* 
(2.00) 
0.0007* 
(2.04) 
GOVSIZ -0.0005 
(-1.24) 
-0.0006 
(-1.09) 
-0.0007 
(-1.30) 
-0.0005 
(-1.06) 
 
OPEN 0.0001 
(1.30) 
0.0001 
(0.43) 
0.0001 
(1.11) 
  
SCHOOL 0.0006 
(0.02) 
-0.017 
(-0.51) 
   
GINI 0.002*** 
(3.68) 
    
R-square(within)  0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Sample 
Groups 
513 
21 
563 
23 
638 
26 
638 
26 
700 
28 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE III 
  Determinants of capital deepening (fixed-effects model) 
 
(c) Sample of French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 0.007 
(0.69) 
0.019 
(1.48) 
0.012 
(0.87) 
0.023* 
(1.92) 
0.018* 
(1.76) 
NATDIS 0.0001 
(0.21) 
-0.0004 
(-0.11) 
-0.0004 
(-0.09) 
0.0003*10-2 
(0.01) 
0.0001 
(0.31) 
GOVSIZ -0.001*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.001** 
(-2.35) 
-0.001 
(-1.65) 
-0.0009 
(-1.40) 
 
OPEN 0.0007*** 
(3.62) 
0.0006*** 
(3.30) 
0.0002 
(1.59) 
  
SCHOOL 0.05*** 
(3.06) 
0.07*** 
(2.80) 
   
GINI 0.0002 
(1.18) 
    
R-square(within)  0.30 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.17 
Sample 
Groups 
533 
23 
558 
24 
674 
29 
674 
29 
725 
29 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE IV 
 Determinants of efficiency improvement (fixed-effects model) 
 
(a) Whole sample  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.04* 
(-1.74) 
-0.05** 
(-2.48) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.06** 
(-2.67) 
-0.05** 
(-2.65) 
NATDIS 0.0004 
(0.77) 
0.0006 
(0.95) 
0.0003 
(0.38) 
0.0002 
(0.38) 
0.0002 
(0.33) 
GOVSIZ -0.0004 
(-0.40) 
-0.0003 
(-0.33) 
-0.0007 
(-0.70) 
-0.0003 
(-0.33) 
 
OPEN 0.0001 
(0.70) 
0.0003 
(1.14) 
0.0003* 
(1.76) 
  
SCHOOL -0.054 
(-1.22) 
-0.058 
(-1.35) 
   
GINI -0.0002 
(-0.97) 
    
R-square(within)  0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Sample 
Groups 
1046 
44 
1121 
47 
1312 
55 
1312 
55 
1425 
57 
 
(b) Sample of non-French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.03 
(-0.99) 
-0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.05* 
(-1.74) 
-0.04 
(-1.56) 
-0.03 
(-1.33) 
NATDIS -0.0001 
(-0.14) 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
-0.0001 
(-0.09) 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
0.0004 
(0.60) 
GOVSIZ -0.002* 
(-2.02) 
-0.002** 
(-2.39) 
-0.003** 
(-2.37) 
-0.002** 
(-2.18) 
 
OPEN 0.0002 
(0.76) 
0.0002 
(1.08) 
0.0002 
(0.74) 
  
SCHOOL -0.10 
(-1.60) 
-0.08 
(-1.40) 
   
GINI -0.002* 
(-1.82) 
    
R-square(within)  0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Sample 
Groups 
513 
21 
563 
23 
638 
26 
638 
26 
700 
28 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE IV 
  Determinants of efficiency improvement (fixed-effects model) 
 
(c) Sample of French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.08*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.11*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.10*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.63) 
NATDIS 0.001 
(1.45) 
0.001 
(1.56) 
0.0003 
(0.19) 
0.0004 
(0.24) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
GOVSIZ 0.002 
(1.39) 
0.003* 
(1.88) 
0.002 
(1.20) 
0.002 
(1.54) 
 
OPEN 0.0003 
(1.01) 
0.0005 
(1.49) 
0.0004** 
(2.41) 
  
SCHOOL 0.001 
(0.02) 
0.009 
(0.17) 
   
GINI -0.0002 
(-0.09) 
    
R-square(within)  0.16 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.10 
Sample 
Groups 
533 
23 
558 
24 
674 
29 
674 
29 
725 
29 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE V 
 Determinants of technological progress (fixed-effects model) 
 
(a) Whole sample  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.008 
(-1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.004 
(0.70) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
NATDIS 0.0005** 
(2.26) 
0.0005** 
(2.64) 
0.0003* 
(1.80) 
0.0003* 
(1.80) 
0.0003 
(1.66) 
GOVSIZ 0.0003 
(0.10) 
-0.0001 
(-0.37) 
-0.0002 
(-0.06) 
0.0001 
(0.21) 
 
OPEN 0.0001* 
(1.77) 
0.0001 
(1.09) 
0.0001 
(1.30) 
  
SCHOOL -0.012 
(-0.53) 
-0.008 
(-0.42) 
   
GINI 0.00001 
(0.08) 
    
R-square(within)  0.33 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.29 
Sample 
Groups 
1046 
44 
1121 
47 
1312 
55 
1312 
55 
1425 
57 
 
(b) Sample of non-French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 -0.015** 
(-2.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
0.004 
(0.48) 
-0.0007 
(-0.08) 
NATDIS 0.0004* 
(1.75) 
0.0006** 
(2.73) 
0.0004* 
(1.81) 
0.0004* 
(1.77) 
0.0004 
(1.63) 
GOVSIZ -0.0001 
(-0.13) 
-0.0001 
(-0.40) 
-0.0004 
(-0.10) 
0.0001 
(0.12) 
 
OPEN 0.0002* 
(2.01) 
0.0001 
(0.77) 
0.0001 
(0.88) 
  
SCHOOL 0.034 
(1.49) 
0.041 
(1.66) 
   
GINI 0.0007 
(1.40) 
    
R-square(within)  0.31 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Sample 
Groups 
513 
21 
563 
23 
638 
26 
638 
26 
700 
28 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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TABLE V 
  Determinants of technological progress (fixed-effects model) 
 
(c) Sample of French legal origin 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
LY_1 0.002 
(0.20) 
0.004 
(0.33) 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
0.006 
(0.71) 
NATDIS 0.0005 
(1.69) 
0.0004 
(1.57) 
0.0002 
(0.85) 
0.0002 
(0.89) 
0.0002 
(0.65) 
GOVSIZ -0.0002 
(-0.48) 
-0.0001 
(-0.37) 
0.00002 
(0.06) 
0.0001 
(0.20) 
 
OPEN 0.0001 
(0.81) 
0.0001 
(0.89) 
0.0001 
(0.87) 
  
SCHOOL -0.037 
(-1.55) 
-0.036 
(-1.61) 
   
GINI -0.0001 
(-0.21) 
    
R-square(within)  0.41 0.44 0.30 0.30 0.33 
Sample 
Groups 
533 
23 
558 
24 
674 
29 
674 
29 
725 
29 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard error. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. For each estimate, year dummies 
are included but are not reported to save space. In each column, the sample size may vary across 
different specifications owing to data availability. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1 
LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
Sample in column 
(1) 
Sample in column 
(2) 
Sample in column 
(3)-(4) 
Sample in column 
(5) 
1 ARGENTINA ARGENTINA ARGENTINA ARGENTINA 
2 AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA 
3 AUSTRIA AUSTRIA AUSTRIA AUSTRIA 
4 BELGIUM BELGIUM BELGIUM BELGIUM 
5 BOLIVIA BOLIVIA BOLIVIA BOLIVIA 
6 CANADA CANADA CANADA CANADA 
7 CHILE CHILE CHILE CHILE 
8 COLOMBIA COLOMBIA COLOMBIA COLOMBIA 
9   COTE D'IVOIRE COTE D'IVOIRE 
10 . . DENMARK DENMARK 
11 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
12 ECUADOR ECUADOR ECUADOR ECUADOR 
13 FRANCE FRANCE FRANCE FRANCE 
14 
GERMANY 
WEST 
GERMANY 
WEST 
GERMANY 
WEST 
GERMANY 
WEST 
15 GREECE GREECE GREECE GREECE 
16 GUATEMALA GUATEMALA GUATEMALA GUATEMALA 
17 HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS 
18 HONG KONG HONG KONG HONG KONG HONG KONG 
19 . ICELAND ICELAND ICELAND 
20 INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA 
21 . . IRAN IRAN 
22 IRELAND IRELAND IRELAND IRELAND 
23 ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL 
24 ITALY ITALY ITALY ITALY 
25 . JAMAICA JAMAICA JAMAICA 
26 JAPAN JAPAN JAPAN JAPAN 
27 KENYA KENYA KENYA KENYA 
28 SOUTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA 
29 . . LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 
30 . . MADAGASCAR MADAGASCAR 
31 MALAWI MALAWI MALAWI MALAWI 
32 MAURITIUS MAURITIUS MAURITIUS MAURITIUS 
33 MEXICO MEXICO MEXICO MEXICO 
34 . . MOROCCO MOROCCO 
35 NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS 
36 NEW ZEALAND NEW ZEALAND NEW ZEALAND NEW ZEALAND 
37 . . NIGERIA NIGERIA 
38 PANAMA PANAMA PANAMA PANAMA 
39 PARAGUAY PARAGUAY PARAGUAY PARAGUAY 
  32 
40 PERU PERU PERU PERU 
41 PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES 
42 PORTUGAL PORTUGAL PORTUGAL PORTUGAL 
43 SIERRA LEONE SIERRA LEONE SIERRA LEONE SIERRA LEONE 
44 SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN 
45 SRI LANKA SRI LANKA SRI LANKA SRI LANKA 
46 SWEDEN SWEDEN SWEDEN SWEDEN 
47 . . SWITZERLAND SWITZERLAND 
48 . SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA 
49 . . . TAIWAN 
50 THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND 
51 TURKEY TURKEY TURKEY TURKEY 
52 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
53 
UNITED 
STATES 
UNITED 
STATES 
UNITED 
STATES 
UNITED 
STATES 
54 VENEZUELA VENEZUELA VENEZUELA VENEZUELA 
55 . . . YUGOSLAVIA 
56 ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA 
57 ZIMBABWE ZIMBABWE ZIMBABWE ZIMBABWE 
 
Note: List shows countries used for estimations in each column of Tables II, III, IV and V. 
 
 
 
